ABSTRACT. This paper evaluates the economic assumptions of economic theory via an examination of the capitalist transformation of creditor-debtor relations in the 18th century. This transformation enabled masses of people to obtain credit without moral opprobrium or social subordination. Classical 18th century economics had the ethical concepts to appreciate these facts. Ironically, contemporary economic theory cannot. I trace this fault to its abstract representations of freedom, efficiency, and markets. The virtues of capitalism lie in the concrete social relations and social meanings through which capital and commodities are exchanged. Contrary to laissez faire capitalism, the conditions for sustaining these concrete capitalist formations require limits on freedom of contract and the scope of private property rights.
CAPITALISM AS AN ABSTRACTION: THE FORMALISM OF ECONOMIC THEORY
A central function of economic theory is to explain and evaluate the operations of capitalist economies. Is economic theory up to the evaluative task? To perform this task, its concepts must be able to adequately represent the virtues and vices of capitalism. That is, when these concepts are applied to actual capitalist practices and institutions, they must be able to discriminate between their better and worse features, and enable measurement of the degree to which they satisfy normative requirements. Most critics of the normative framework of economic theory fault it for failing to recognize the vices of capitalism -for example, its inability to evaluate the inequality that capitalism generates. My thesis turns this critique on its head: the assumptions of economic theory fail to represent some of the virtues of capitalism. They fail to grasp some ways in which capitalism advanced freedom and equality. One way was by transforming the social relations of creditors to debtors. This enabled millions of people to obtain credit without having to give up their personal independence to or demean themselves before their creditors.
I shall argue that the ethical assumptions of economic theory cannot represent this transformation as virtuous, because they are too abstract.
The kinds of freedom and equality that fundamentally matter, and that capitalism expanded, are embodied in concrete social relations governed by specific legal constraints and social norms. Freedom involves, at least, freedom from bondage to others. Equality involves a kind of social standing before others, premised on terms of interaction consistent with the dignity of both parties. Economic theory represents freedom and equality in abstraction from these concrete social relations. It represents freedom as freedom of contract -freedom to alienate any property to another, including property in the self. Equality is formal equality -the equal right to enter contracts and own property. These abstractions do not distinguish between free contracts and contracts into bondage, or between agreements reached by self-debasement or a dignified offer.
It follows that the virtues of capitalism cannot be deduced from the bare forms of private property and voluntary exchange. They depend on conditions not represented in the standard economic arguments for capitalism. These conditions often require constraints on the scope of freedom of contract and property rights, against the laissez faire ideal.
THREE MORAL ECONOMIES OF DEBT
Let us explore the development of creditor-debtor relations as our window into the moral transformations brought about by capitalism in Europe and America. At the emergence of the transatlantic economy of Europe and her American colonies in the 17th and 18th centuries, three moral economies of debt were in play: Christian, aristocratic, and capitalist.
Within the Christian ethic, credit had long been a morally perilous institution. For centuries, the Catholic Church had prohibited, on Biblical authority (Deut. 23:19) , the charging of interest among Christians. The task of doing so was assigned to Jews, who were thereby constituted as social pariahs (Nelson, 1969, pp. 6, 14) . Although the Protestant Reformation had relaxed the rules against interest (Nelson, 1969, pp. 67, 78-83) , and interest had become indispensable to the transatlantic economy, the granting of loans among Christians without interest was still commonplace. By the 18th century, the main moral onus of credit rested with debtors. Indebtedness carried a moral taint, suggesting profligacy and vanity. Failure to pay off one's debts was a sin. Debtors in default could be bound over in service to their creditors, or thrown into debtors' prison. These punishments were mentioned in the Bible (e.g., 2 Kings 4:1; Matthew 18:25), and widely practiced in Europe and the Americas. 
